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There has been a great expansion of research into human reasoning at all of Marr’s
explanatory levels. There is a tendency for this work to progress within a level largely
ignoring the others which can lead to slippage between levels (Chater et al., 2003). It
is argued that recent brain imaging research on deductive reasoning—implementational
level—has largely ignored the new paradigm in reasoning—computational level (Over,
2009). Consequently, recent imaging results are reviewed with the focus on how they
relate to the new paradigm. The imaging results are drawn primarily from a recent meta-
analysis by Prado et al. (2011) but further imaging results are also reviewed where relevant.
Three main observations are made. First, the main function of the core brain region
identified is most likely elaborative, defeasible reasoning not deductive reasoning. Second,
the subtraction methodology and the meta-analytic approach may remove all traces of
content specific System 1 processes thought to underpin much human reasoning. Third,
interpreting the function of the brain regions activated by a task depends on theories of
the function that a task engages. When there are multiple interpretations of that function,
interpreting what an active brain region is doing is not clear cut. It is concluded that there is
a need to more tightly connect brain activation to function, which could be achieved using
formalized computational level models and a parametric variation approach.
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This paper presents a focused review of the brain imaging results
on deductive reasoning. The focus is given by the new paradigm
in reasoning (Over, 2009; also see Elqayam and Over, 2013, which
is an introduction to a special issue in the new paradigm), which
is based on Bayesian probability and dual processes. This new
paradigm offers an alternative theoretical framework to those
typically assumed in imaging research on deductive reasoning.
In providing such a review, it is fortuitous that there has been
a recent detailed meta-analysis of this area (Prado et al., 2011).
I therefore concentrate on the findings of this meta-analysis,
bringing in other relevant imaging results as they bear on the line
of argument.
I first discuss why we might expect slippage between different
levels of explanation in reasoning research in terms of Marr’s
levels. Brain imaging is concerned with the implementational
level whereas the new paradigm is a computational level theory.
I then summarize the results of Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-
analysis of 28 imaging studies. I then introduce the new paradigm
and trace the consequences of its two critical features—(i)
it is probabilistic and (ii) it invokes dual processes—for the
interpretation of these brain imaging results. In doing so, I
make several proposals. First, the main function of the core
brain region identified by Prado et al. (2011) is most likely
elaborative, defeasible reasoning not deductive reasoning. Second,
the subtraction methodology and the meta-analytic approach
may remove all traces of content specific System 1 processes
thought by many to underpin much if not most human reasoning.
Third, interpreting the function of brain regions activated by
a task depends on our theories of the function that a task
engages. When there are multiple interpretations of that function,
interpreting what an active brain region is doing is not clear cut.
Moreover, this issue is not resolvable at the implementational
level. I conclude that imaging research may need to catch up
with the computational level where there has been much recent
progress.
COMPUTATIONAL LEVELS
The multilevel nature of computational explanation in the
cognitive sciences leads to multiple research strategies for
investigating the cognitive processes that underlie any human
behavior. At Marr’s (1982) computational level, the function that
the mind/brain is believed to be computing in the performance
of some task is specified. At the algorithmic level, the sequence
of processing steps that compute this function is specified. At
this level, various processing limitations need to be taken in to
account, which may serve a critical explanatory role, e.g., working
memory limitations. Finally, at the implementational level, the
actual physical hardware in which the cognitive algorithm is
instantiated in the brain is specified. At this level, the limitations
of the physical components implementing the cognitive algorithm
are taken into account, e.g., the time course of neural responses.
As Marr envisaged these levels, addressing the computational level
was the priority, i.e., the “function first” approach, because only
this strategy was likely to prove successful. For example, little
progress was made in understanding the operation of the heart
until it was realized that its function was to circulate blood around
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 101 | 1
Oaksford Imaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigm
the body. This multilevel nature of computational explanation
means that researchers often pursue different research strategies
that focus on only one level, usually determined by their own
particular technical competences. This is usually unproblematic
but it can create slippage between levels whereby research may
proceed at different paces for a period of time, i.e., one level
may move ahead while our understanding at the other levels lags
behind (Chater et al., 2003).
In this paper, I argue that there has been slippage between
the computational and implementational levels in the study
human reasoning. Brain imaging research has largely appealed
to theoretical frameworks at the computational level that over
the last 20 years have been strongly challenged by the new
probabilistic paradigm in human reasoning (Oaksford and
Chater, 1994, 2001, 2007; Over, 2009; Elqayam and Over, 2013).
In this paper, I examine what may be involved in re-aligning these
levels of explanation in reasoning research.
IMAGING RESULTS: PRADO ET AL.’S (2011) META-ANALYSIS
In describing the existing research on the brain imaging
of deductive reasoning, a good starting point is to briefly
summarize Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis. These studies
initially presented a confusing set of results, which led (Goel,
2007, p. 440), to suggest that there may not be a unitary
neural system for deductive reasoning, but rather “a fractionated
system that is dynamically configured in response to certain
task and environmental cues”. Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-
analysis seems to reveal more consistency amongst these studies.
They appear to show a core, mainly left lateralized, system
being active in deductive reasoning with other subsystems
being recruited dependent on the nature of the task, be it
propositional, categorical, or relational reasoning. The core
system involved the left lateralized inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG), middle frontal gyrus (MFG), precentral gyrus (PG),
posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and the basal ganglia (BG);
it also included one medial structure, the medial frontal
gyrus (MeFG). Prado et al. (2011) interpret this finding
as consistent with the “left brain interpreter” hypothesis
(Roser and Gazzaniga, 2006). The left hemisphere is primarily
engaged in interpreting incoming information and filling in
the missing information via inferential processes. The primary
involvement of left lateralized brain systems seems to run
counter to some accounts of human reasoning that place special
emphasis on visual-spatial representations and processes, i.e.,
mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), which are primarily right
lateralized.
Additional systems seem to be recruited for specific deductive
tasks. Propositional reasoning involves relations between
propositions like if the key is turned, the car starts, the key is
turned, therefore, the car starts. This is the classical propositional
inference of modus ponens and it depends purely on the
connectives (if. . .then here but also and, or, not) and not on
any deeper analysis of the propositions involved. Relational
and categorical reasoning rely on going deeper in to the
subject/predicate structure of a proposition. Categorical
reasoning involves categorical statements like All artists are
beekeepers, where “artists” is the subject and “beekeepers” is the
predicate. This mode of reasoning is typically investigated using
two premise quantified syllogisms such as All artist are beekeepers,
Some artists are smokers, therefore, Some beekeepers are smokers.
Relational reasoning moves from unary predicates, involving
one variable, to relations, usually only binary, e.g., John is taller
than Fred. These are typically investigated using the transitive
inference paradigm—John is taller than Fred, Fred is taller than
Jane, is Jane taller than John?—and spatial reasoning, e.g., John is
to the left of Fred, Fred is to the right of Jane, is Jane to the right of
John?
Relational arguments activate bilateral PPC and right MFG.
Bilateral activation of the PPC is commonly seen in studies of
visuospatial tasks and the reliable activation of right PPC in
relational arguments seems consistent with theories like mental
models. Categorical arguments only show strong activation of left
lateralized IFG and BG and this activation is more consistent than
for relational or propositional reasoning. These regions seem to be
most consistently associated with processing syntax and grammar
(e.g., Goel et al., 2000; Ullman, 2006; Grodzinsky and Santi,
2008). Propositional arguments are also left lateralized and most
strongly activate PPC, PG, and MeFG. PPC and MeFG have been
associated with non-syntactic verbal processing and maintaining
abstract rules in memory respectively (Bunge et al., 2003; Booth
et al., 2007).
Prado et al. (2011) draw an important conclusion from the
finding that there is no one neural system apparently involved
in all three domains of deductive reasoning investigated in these
studies. No theory that suggests that these different domains
all rely on a unitary underlying cognitive process is likely to
be able to explain these results. Only some types of reasoning,
apparently relational reasoning, seem to invoke visuospatial
processing, propositional and categorical reasoning do not. They
suggest that this tends to rule out unitary theories like mental
logic (e.g., Rips, 1994) and mental models (Johnson-Laird,
1983) which propose that either formal rules or visuospatial
representations underlie all deductive reasoning. Indeed, mental
models theory makes the broader claim that such unitary
visuospatial representations underlie all reasoning, deductive or
inductive.
In most of the studies in Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis,
the theoretical rationale was to compare just two computational
and implementational level theories of human reasoning. At
the computational level, both mental models and mental logic
theories take standard binary truth functional logic as defining
the function the cognitive system is trying to compute.1 They
diverge only on the nature of the representations and processes
that implement this logic in the human mind i.e., they disagree
primarily at the algorithmic level. Framing these investigations
1This can be disputed (Schroyens, 2010). It is possible that mental
models has introduced slippage between the computational and algorithmic
levels. That is, mental models has been making advances by proposing a
particular representation/process pair which can mimic logic under certain
circumstances but the actual full computational level theory of mental models,
i.e., the actual logic it implements at the algorithmic level, remains to be
defined. This is a coherent proposal and there may be candidate logics that
might make good on this claim. However, I have never heard this argument
put forward by any other mental models theorist.
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as deciding between these two theories also suggests that
investigating deductive reasoning means to only study reasoning
which can be captured by standard logic. However, it is arguable
that over the last 15–20 years the most notable progress in
the study of human reasoning has been at the computational
level where alternative probabilistic theories of what people are
doing in deductive reasoning tasks have been proposed (Hahn,
2014). These probabilistic accounts have become known as the
“new paradigm” (Over, 2009; Manktelow, 2012). I now trace
the origins of the new paradigm and its consequences for the
interpretation of neuroimaging data.
THE NEW PARADIGM
There are two strands to the new paradigm. First, it is
probabilistic. Second, it is a dual process theory that invokes both
System 1 and System 2 processes (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011).
System 1 is Kahneman’s (2011) fast system and System 2 is his slow
system. I look first at the probabilistic strand and its motivations
and relate these directly to some of the results discussed in Prado
et al. (2011).
PROBABILITIES
In motivating the probabilistic strand of the new paradigm, I
begin with a quote from Dennett:
“But it is obviously true that most people never engage in explicit
non-enthymematic formal reasoning” (Dennett, 1998, p. 289).
Enthymematic reasoning, for example, Tweety is a bird
therefore Tweety flies, explicitly involves the use of world
knowledge in order to fill in information not explicitly stated, i.e.,
that all birds fly, normally birds fly or the probability that birds fly is
high. We make these inferences automatically with little conscious
thought. As Dennett’s remark implies, this is the kind of inference
that underpins our everyday lives and interactions with others.
It also implies that the kind of “non-enthymematic formal”
reasoning required in most of the reasoning tasks investigated in
Prado et al. (2011) and in most deductive reasoning tasks used in
the lab, are not commonly engaged in by the man or woman in
the street. Consequently, attempting to derive a general theory of
human reasoning by investigating these kinds of tasks is perhaps
to step off on the wrong foot.
Concerns could be assuaged if this kind enthymematic
reasoning could be captured by standard logic. However, one of
the primary motivations for moving to probabilistic theories in
the new paradigm has been the fact that enthymematic reasoning
is defeasible (Oaksford and Chater, 1991, 2007). That is, learning
that Tweety is an ostrich defeats the inference that Tweety
can fly on learning that Tweety is a bird. We have rehearsed
the problems of attempting to reconstruct such reasoning in
standard logic many times before and do not do so again here
(Oaksford and Chater, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2007). The probabilistic
approach characterizes these inferences as being underpinned by
probabilistic relations such as being a bird makes the probability
that something flies high. That is, the world knowledge that
underpins the enthymematic inference above is something like,
if x is a bird then x can fly, where Pr(if x is a bird then x can fly) =
Pr(x can fly|x is a bird) and this probability is high.
Another important aspect of this kind of reasoning, which
Fodor (1983) calls non-demonstrative inference, is that it is the
prototypical central cognitive process (Fodor, 1983; Oaksford
and Chater, 1991). The contrast between modular and central
cognitive processes is drawn along the lines of those that require
large amounts of world knowledge and those that do not. Fodor
(1983) argued that central cognitive processes are Quinean.2
A process is Quinean when it apparently invokes the whole
of our belief system. So the reason we draw the inference that
Tweety can fly is that this is the most plausible inference to
draw. But plausibility is only definable against the backdrop
of everything else we know or believe. Moreover, any Bayesian
probabilistic account is going to be Quinean. Our best bet about
how we determine someone’s subjective probability Pr(x can
fly|x is a bird) is given by the Ramsey test. This test involves
assuming Tweety is a bird, i.e., adding this proposition to our
stock of beliefs while making minimum adjustments to our other
beliefs, and reading off our new degree of belief that Tweety
flies. This is a philosophical prescription but its implications
for psychological processes are clear: defeasible reasoning,
probabilistically construed or not, must invoke central cognitive
processes.
Imaging, inference and central cognitive processes
This brief account of the underlying motivations for the
probabilistic strand of the new paradigm (see also, Oaksford and
Chater, 2007, Chapters 1–4) leads to two conclusions that appear
to be supported by the imaging results discussed by Prado et al.
(2011). First, Prado et al. (2011) identify their left lateralized
core system with Gazzaniga’s “left brain interpreter” hypothesis
(Roser and Gazzaniga, 2006). It is important to be clear on the
nature of the inferences that underpin this hypothesis. A main
source of evidence for the left brain interpreter hypothesis is the
elaborative inferences that some patients and normal participants
make in interpreting pictures. These elaborative inferences seem
to be responsible for false recognition of novel pictures as being
previously viewed. Of course, our enthymematic inference that
Tweety can fly is an elaborative inference of precisely this sort.
It could only be construed deductively if the enthymematically
provided premise was all birds can fly but then it would not be
defeasible. But all elaborative and enthymematic inferences are
defeasible and people may not even be aware of the fact that
they have drawn one until it is overturned, e.g., on being told
Tweety is an ostrich, and the mild sense of surprise that they
then experience. In sum, if the left brain interpreter hypothesis
is correct as an interpretation of the brain imaging results, then
its primary function is probably not in deductive reasoning but
rather elaborative, defeasible, and probabilistic reasoning. At
least this is the kind of reasoning that has provided the principal
evidence for the left brain interpreter hypothesis in the past.
2The philosopher, Willard Van Ormond Quine, famously commented that a
belief can always be saved from refutation by making adjustments elsewhere
in our belief system, i.e., the mechanisms of belief fixation and revision are
holistic, depending on everything else that we know or believe (Quine, 1953).
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Second, such defeasible, probabilistic reasoning, as we have
just discussed, is perhaps our best candidate for a central cognitive
process. That is, it is one of the processes that is least likely to be
subserved by a unitary cognitive module. And this would appear
to be exactly what the brain imaging data reveals, reasoning is
not subserved by a unitary cognitive process, be it formal rules
or visual spatial representations, in a single isolable module. It is
also worth noting that, given the defeasible, probabilistic nature of
the inferences that underpin the left brain interpreter hypothesis,
when deployed in deductive tasks this brain system is probably not
being used to perform functions for which it originally evolved.
That is, at best, deductive reasoning is a limiting case of this
system’s primary function, for example, when the probabilities go
to 0 or 1.
Deductive tasks
A possible objection to the line of argument in the last section
is that the imaging results reviewed in Prado et al. (2011)
specifically focused on deduction, i.e., the tasks were very
specifically deductive tasks, which could not form the evidential
basis for generalizing to defeasible non-demonstrative reasoning.
However, in the reasoning literature mental models theory has
taken these tasks to provide the basis for a wholly general
theory of reasoning subsuming deduction (Johnson-Laird and
Byrne, 1991), probabilistic inductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird
et al., 1999), causal reasoning (Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird,
2001) and much else besides. Moreover, mental logic and mental
models are the theoretical frameworks on which the imaging
research has primarily concentrated. The new paradigm argues
that because everyday, defeasible reasoning is the ubiquitous
phenomena people apply sensible reasoning strategies for dealing
with the everyday world to laboratory deductive reasoning tasks.
This strategy can explain away many of the so called biases
observed in human deductive reasoning (Oaksford and Chater,
2007).
Could it nonetheless be argued that the specific tasks used in
the imaging studies review by Prado et al. (2011) are uniquely
deductive and consequently they genuinely investigate just this
very narrow domain of human reasoning? A point I elaborate
on further below, is that we require a computational level theory
to define the function that a task engages (Functions, Tasks, and
Active Regions). In imaging research, “deduction” is taken to refer
to binary truth functional logic as it is in mental logic and mental
model theory. But there are a range of alternative logics especially
for the conditional (see, e.g., Haack, 1975; Bennett, 2003) and
there are well specified probabilistic accounts of categorical
reasoning (Chater and Oaksford, 1999). Moreover, there are
varieties of probability logic (Adams, 1998) in which coherent
probability intervals are deduced from probability assignments to
the premises (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010; Pfeifer, 2013). Such logics
are just as deductive as binary truth functional logic.
Perhaps it could be argued that at least tasks like relational
and spatial reasoning have deterministic binary logical solutions
and as such are genuinely “deductive” tasks in the sense intended
in mental logic and mental models theory. However, phenomena
like perspectival relativity (Barwise and Perry, 1983) question this
view. Take, for example, the premises John is to the left of Fred, Fred
is to the right of Jane which is assumed to lead to the deterministic
logical conclusion that Jane is to the right of John. If Jane and
John are both facing each other with Fred in the middle facing
neither then the question of whether Jane is to the right of John
has no deterministic answer, they are neither to the left nor to
the right of each other, despite the truth of the premises. Left
and right depend on our subjective frame of reference in personal
space. Another example is if Fred is standing at the North pole
and Jane and John at the South pole. In this case, Jane and John
would appear to be simultaneously to Fred’s left and to his right.
Such counterexamples suggest that there are certain orientations
that make the conclusion more likely but it does not follow
deterministically. Even relations like taller, which rely on being
able to measure the world, may require a probabilistic theory.
Measurement error suggests that our representations of items on
a scale use distributions which may overlap. Such representations
can explain the symbolic distance effect where for a long transitive
chain, e.g., a > b > c > d > e (“>” = is taller than), people
find it harder to discriminate whether c > d than a > e (Cohen
Kadosh et al., 2005). In summary, tasks are not deductive in and
of themselves. What function a task engages is determined by
the empirically most adequate computational level theory of that
task.
Imaging: deduction vs. induction
We have argued that the core system identified by Prado
et al. (2011) is concerned with defeasible, non-demonstrative
reasoning. The new paradigm has been characterized as
“imperialistic” (Rips, 2002) in that it attempts to assimilate
deduction to probabilistic inductive reasoning. However, there is
behavioral data suggesting that these processes dissociate (Rips,
2001; Heit and Rotello, 2010). Although recently Lassiter and
Goodman (2015) have shown these differences may have more
to do with the semantics of the terms used to elicit people’s
responses, i.e., is the conclusion “necessary” (deduction) or
“plausible” (induction), than with fundamental differences in
the reasoning process which remains probabilistic. A suggestion
originally made by Oaksford and Hahn (2007). There is also
imaging data relevant to this question.
Goel and Dolan (2004) found that some structures were more
active in deduction (left IFG) than in induction and that some
were more active in induction (primarily left MFG) than in
deduction. They argue that their findings are more consistent
with other studies, particularly lesion studies, than previous
work apparently showing that these modes of reasoning were
lateralized with induction associated with the left hemisphere and
deduction with the right (Parsons and Osherson, 2001). Goel and
Dolan’s (2004) studies were included in Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-
analysis and both these structures are part of the core system they
identified. Goel and Dolan argue that left IFG is associated with
Broca’s area and hence language, working memory and perhaps
syntactic processing. Left MFG activation, they hypothesize is
associated with the recruitment of general knowledge required for
induction.
Induction and deduction activate much the same brain
system. Moreover, given the nature of these inferences even what
differential patterns of activation there were are understandable.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 101 | 4
Oaksford Imaging deductive reasoning and the new paradigm
The new paradigm does not deny that deduction and induction
are distinct (Evans and Over, 2013). Deduction involves
inferences over the syncategorematic or logical terms of a
language (if. . .then, and, or, not, all etc.), i.e., the inference
follows from the meaning of these terms. This is not the case
for the inductive inferences that Rips (2001), Goel and Dolan
(2004), and Heit and Rotello (2010) investigated which involved
categorical induction. In deduction processing of the structure
of premises is important but it is less so for the premises of
an inductive inference which may simply present a string of
facts (e.g., domestic cats have 32 teeth, lions have 32 teeth).
Moreover, we learn about the world by observation in a similar
way, i.e., inductive inferences do not have to be mediated by
language in the way deductive inferences are. In probability
logic, the meaning of the conditional is given by the conditional
probability. The assertion of a conditional means that that the
conditional probability is high. So while both inferences types
are probabilistic, and both rely to a degree on world knowledge,
there is an important structural difference between induction and
deduction, which is what Goel and Dolan’s result are presumably
picking up. A final observation is that we can find no lesion
study showing a full double dissociation between induction and
deduction. Although Goel and Dolan cite one case study involving
a single dissociation using a theory of mind task (Varley and
Siegal, 2000), no classical deductive or inductive reasoning tasks
were used.
DUAL PROCESSES
In the new paradigm, it is agreed that a dual process theory
is required (Evans and Over, 2004; Evans, 2010; Oaksford and
Chater, 2010, 2011; Stanovich, 2011). System 1 is implicit,
probabilistic, and based on world knowledge. System 2 is explicit,
involves working memory, and is based on “analytic” processes.
These analytic processes have been argued to be either also
probabilistic (Evans and Over, 2004; Oaksford and Chater, 2009,
2010, 2011; Evans, 2010; Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010) or based on
standard binary logic (Rips, 1994, 2001; Stanovich and West,
2000; Heit and Rotello, 2010; Klauer et al., 2010; Stanovich, 2011).
Whatever view one takes, it is generally agreed that deductive
reasoning behavior is a product of an interaction between both
these systems.
Kahneman (2011) uses some instructive examples to illustrate
the nature of System 1 and System 2 processes. To illustrate System
1, he simply presents the juxtaposition of two words:
Banana Vomit
As he observes, a whole panoply of responses are triggered
automatically by this juxtaposition. A whole causal story is
probably constructed connecting the ingestion of bananas and
vomiting. Moreover, a mild sense of surprise is invoked by this
unusual juxtaposition. Unpleasant visual and auditory images
will also be briefly triggered. The processes that produce these
reactions happen unconsciously and very rapidly, all we are
aware of is a reaction. He illustrates System 2, by tasks like
counting back in threes from say 1037. This task is effortful, fully
conscious, difficult to keep going, and involves applying the rules
of arithmetic. Tasks illustrating the interaction of these systems
are those like the bat and ball problem. In this task participants
are told that the bat costs a dollar more than the ball and that
together they cost $1.10 and they are asked how much does the
ball cost? A spontaneous System 1 response is ten cents, which
must be wrong because this would make the total cost of the bat
and ball $1.20. In such tasks, the automatic System 1 response may
need to be overridden and the actual cost consciously calculated
in System 2.
In deductive reasoning tasks, it may be that a spontaneous
System 1 response needs to be overridden but it seems unlikely
that lay participants are capable of then engaging the correct
logical rules in System 2 as they can the rules arithmetic for the
bat and ball problem. Except for the logically trained these rules
are simply not consciously available (of course for the bat and
ball problem to be solvable, the rules of arithmetic also had to
be learned). Consequently in deductive reasoning performance, it
is probably best not to consider System 2 as conscious. This seems
consistent with recent work on logical intuitions which shows that
people appear to unconsciously detect the conflict between the
intuitive System 1 response and the correct response even if they
make the apparently biased System 1 response (De Neys, 2012,
2014). What people will be conscious of is a response, initially
triggered by System 1, accompanied by a feeling of rightness
(Thompson et al., 2011). This feeling may well depend on how
the intuitive System 1 response agrees or conflicts with the output
of System 2.
A great deal of work in the new paradigm is on showing
that apparently irrational performance on many tasks is actually
rational from a probabilistic perspective. Moreover, much of this
behavior is hypothesized to be the responsibility of System 1.
Kahneman’s illustrative example of System 1 in action suggests
that much of the information required by a rational theory
of inference and decision is automatically computed at this
level. For example, to understand the juxtaposition of just these
two words people seem to generate a causal model relating
the ingestion of bananas to vomiting. Moreover, a surprising
event is one that is improbable, which suggests that relevant
probabilities are automatically computed. Furthermore, people
have a spontaneous emotional reaction to this juxtaposition
expressing relevant hedonic or experienced utilities. The almost
immediate availability of all this information may suggest
that System 1 is indeed capable of some complex inferential
processes, consistent with logical intuitions (De Neys, 2012,
2014).
Recently, it has been suggested that System 1 uses this
information in inference in a similar way to the unconscious
inferences involved in perception and action hypothesized by
Helmholtz (Oaksford, 2014, Submitted). Again most progress on
unconscious inference is being made at the computational level by
computational biologists. These unconscious inferential processes
are being understood in probabilistic terms in the Bayesian brain
hypothesis (Dayan and Hinton, 1996; Friston, 2005, 2008; Clark,
2013). In brief, perception is viewed as the process of using
alternative generative models of the current context to generate
hypotheses about the causes of the pertubations of our sensory
surfaces. These hypotheses, e.g., it is a dog or it is a cat, are at the
top level of a hierarchical Bayesian model and these cascade down
making lower level predictions ultimately for the responses of
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center surround units in our sensory receptors. Prediction errors,
e.g., the hypothesis says the unit should be on when it is off, are
then fed back up the hierarchy minimizing expected surprise or
entropy concerning the cause of the proximal stimulus, i.e., the
least surprising interpretation is adopted. It has also been shown
how these cascaded inferential processes can be implemented in
cortex.
In sum, most reasoning is largely unconscious, it occurs
automatically based on the rich information generated by System
1 which also seems directly implicated in unconscious inferences
in perception and action. Our theories of System 1 in the
psychology of explicit verbal reasoning and our theories of
unconscious inference in perception and action also converge on
a Bayesian account.3 This means that content, which fixes the
relevant probabilities, is central to the reasoning process. But most
imaging studies have framed their investigations in term of mental
logic and mental models in which content is largely irrelevant.
As I now argue, this fact may have important consequences for
the interpretation of imaging results in the psychology of verbal
reasoning.
Imaging system 1
Most brain imaging studies use the subtraction methodology
to isolate brain regions that are specific to deduction and this
usually involves contrasting materials with relevant content. So
for example, in Goel and Dolan (2003) experiments on belief bias
in categorical reasoning, materials like:
(A) No reptiles can grow hair
Some elephants can grow hair
So, No elephants are reptiles (true conclusion, invalid
inference) were contrasted with a baseline:
(B) No reptiles can grow hair
Some elephants can grow hair
No fried foods have cholesterol
Subtracting out activation due to this baseline may remove any
traces of the automatically activated content based processes like
those involved in Kahneman’s System 1 example. These processes
are automatically activated by the content of the words which are
also present in the contrast. But if most of the inferential action is
at the System 1 level this means that the subtraction methodology
may be removing most activations of interest (see also, Monti and
Osherson, 2012, for a similar line of argument). Other contrasts
that have been used, e.g., a simple fixation location, may seem
to avoid this problem. However, even if such contrasts retained
activations associated with content, the goal of Prado et al.’s
(2011) meta-analysis was to detect active regions across studies.
Consequently, these content based activations will be removed in
the meta-analysis because content varied between studies (and
indeed between tasks).
Content-based System 1 activations may be subject to a
great deal of variation not only across studies but also across
individuals. Would one expect, for example, there to be much
3This is also important because it suggests a unified account of System 1 and
unconscious inference in perception and action (Oaksford, 2014, Submitted).
spatial overlap between two people’s representations of the
concept “horse”? When one thinks of horses, regions associated
with their shapes, movements, smells, and locations where they
have been encountered are activated and binding these disparate
responses together is the crucial step in having the concept
“horse”. Given what is likely to be a diffuse pattern of activation,
presumably involving different sensory centers and memories,
it seems unlikely that there will be much spatial overlap in
regions activated across individuals, especially given the good
spatial resolution of fMRI. Presumably this information is lost
as a result of aggregating across individuals: even though each
individual is doing the same thing slightly different brain regions
are active.
Some studies support this contention. Having people think of
a particular concept, e.g., “horse,” leads to diffuse activation of
many regions across the whole brain (Pereira et al., 2011). Pereira
et al. (2011) also showed that at a certain level of abstraction
these activation patterns could predict the topic being thought
about and words associated with those topics. This was achieved
by extracting a latent topic model from Wikipedia articles.
Using machine learning technique a mapping was learnt between
the latent factors that summarized the articles and patterns of
distributed brain activity. This mapping could then be inverted to
use the pattern of brain activity to predict the topic being thought
about and hence words associated with that topic. Consequently,
at quite a high level of abstraction there may be some consistency
between topics being thought about and the spatial distribution
of activation in the brain. However, we know of no work that
relates individual concepts, such as “horse” to consistent patterns
of activation across individuals. Moreover, the simple fact that
these activations do not survive the subtraction methodology
used in the reasoning studies summarized by Prado et al. (2011)
suggests that across individuals there is little consistency in the
brain regions activated.
The notion that for many different concepts and events
people’s own unique experience may fail to lead to patterns of
brain activity that generalize fully across individuals is consistent
with the subjective nature of probabilities in the new Bayesian
paradigm. Our own unique experiences mean we may assign quite
different probabilities to the same events. Indeed, if we did not
differ in our beliefs in this way then there would be nothing
to argue about at the social level where, it has been argued,
most reasoning goes on (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Mercier and
Sperber, 2011).
In summary, these imaging studies are not recording System 1
in action.
Functions, tasks, and active regions
I have concentrated so far on what imaging studies may miss
in investigating System 1 processes. Before moving on to look
at the difficulties in interpreting the activations that remain, I
pause briefly to consider the relationship between cognitive tasks,
the functions they engage and the interpretation of active brain
regions. I argue that (i) function comes first, and two (ii) the
function a task engages may be in dispute. In the next section,
I trace the consequences of (i) and (ii) for the interpretations of
the regions identified by Prado et al. (2011).
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Function is assigned partly historically. For example, in
investigating belief bias, Goel and Dolan (2003) contrasted correct
and incorrect performance on trials that show a conflict between
the validity of an inference and the truth of the conclusion
(see (A) and (B)). One contrast revealed activation of right
inferior prefrontal cortex (rIPFC) and the other of ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). How do we interpret such findings?
This question is answered partly in terms of the nature of the
current task but also in terms of past history. So rIPFC is active
when correct responses are made to conflict problems implicating
inhibitory processes consistent with previous results. VMPFC is
active when incorrect responses are made to conflict problems
implicating intuitive, emotional processes, again consistent with
previous results. The functions assigned to these regions are partly
based on computational level assumptions. These determine
the “correct” response and the assumption that “inhibition” is
required to identify the correct response. But it is also based on
history, what tasks (with assumed functions) have activated the
region in the past. While this is all perfectly reasonable, there are
potential problems.
First, there is the problem of a general historical bias. Just
because a certain type of task, t1, with a certain presumed
function, f1, was first found to activate a region, r1, then this
is the function associated with that region. But this is simply a
historical artifact. If the current task, t2, with presumed function,
f2, had been investigated first and found to activate region r1
then f2 would be the function presumed to be engaged when this
region is activated and t1 may be assumed to engage f2 as well
as f1.
Second, this line of argument suggests that interpreting
imaging results requires us to be very clear on the functions that
cognitive tasks engage. Moreover, if this is clear then function
drives interpretation. If region r1 is activated by t2, even though
it has been previously associated with f1, it must now be regarded
as also computing f2. At least there is no reason, other than
history, to argue that instead t2 engages f1. Moreover, in cognitive
science, and in particular deductive reasoning, the task/function
relationship may be in dispute. So called deductive tasks, say t1,
are being interpreted as not engaging deduction, f1, but rather
probabilistic reasoning, f2. We can only interpret the function of
a brain region in terms of the tasks that engage those functions
and activate that region. If our theory of the function engaged
by a task changes, then so does our interpretation of what active
brain regions are doing. For example, later on I argue that the
computational level assumptions underlying the interpretation of
belief bias results (Goel and Dolan, 2003) may be wrong (NIRS,
TMS and Belief Bias). Imaging studies are only informative against
the backdrop of a computational level theory of the tasks used
in these studies. Consequently, whatever one’s preferred research
strategy, i.e., whether you concentrate on the implementational,
algorithmic, or computational level, function comes first.4
4Clearly the weight of evidence matters here. For example, if across a broad
range of different tasks, t1. . .tn, thought to engage probabilistic reasoning, r1
is consistently activated but it is not in say tn+1, i.e., a nominally deductive
task, then we might be begin to be persuaded that probabilistic reasoning
is not involved in deductive tasks. However, (i) this question has not been
Imaging beyond system 1
Against the backdrop of these last two arguments, I now consider
the other patterns of activation that Prado et al. (2011) found
with relational, categorical and propositional reasoning. With
relational arguments, in particular in transitive inference, e.g.,
A is taller than B, B is taller than C. . .etc, is C taller than A?,
Prado et al. (2011) found activation of bilateral PPC and right
MFG consistent with the use of visual representations. Although
this finding has recently been qualified by results showing that
when the transitive chain involves quantifiers, all A are B, all
B are C. . .etc, only left hemisphere activation is found (Prado
et al., 2013). These findings suggest, what many researchers have
suspected, that relational and spatial reasoning are not part of
our core reasoning system. Rather when such arguments can be
easily represented visually the mind/brain exploits this fact but
this is a specific strategy. Moreover, as Prado et al. (2013) have
shown, when this strategy is difficult, i.e., when the transitive
chain involves whole sets and not individuals, the system reverts
to the left brain interpreter.
Prado et al.’s (2013) results also argue against the mental
model theory of quantified syllogistic reasoning. In this account,
categorical reasoning proceeds over an imagistic representation
of a small number of arbitrary exemplars of the sets described
by the quantifiers. So according to mental model theory both
categorical reasoning and relational reasoning should engage right
lateralized systems. In contrast, the main probabilistic account of
categorical reasoning, the probability heuristics model (Chater
and Oaksford, 1999; Oaksford et al., 2002), suggests that a
simple set of probabilistically motivated heuristics operate over
linguistic representations of the premise and conclusion. Prado
et al.’s (2011) results for categorical reasoning are consistent with
this account. They show strong activation of left lateralized IFG
and BG, regions most consistently associated with processing
syntax and grammar. The heuristics in PHM select a syntactic
conclusion frame using probabilistically motivated heuristics and
then use other heuristics to determine the order of end terms
in this syntactic frame (Oaksford et al., 2002). These heuristics
depend on an ordering over the informativeness (the inverse of
probability) of the premises. Specific content has the potential
to alter this informativeness ordering leading the heuristics to
make different predictions. While this possibility has never been
experimentally tested, it shows that even this relatively abstractly
defined probabilistic theory still relies on System 1, i.e., on
content.
Prado et al. (2011) found that propositional arguments most
strongly activate PPC and MeFG which have been associated with
non-syntactic verbal processing and maintaining abstract rules in
memory respectively. Perhaps the most researched and important
area in propositional reasoning is conditional reasoning, i.e.,
reasoning using what is rendered in English as if. . .then. Most
recent research has involved causal conditional reasoning, where
it is clear that the specific contents are important. However,
conditional reasoning has also been extensively researched using
investigated with a broad range of different tasks, and (ii) as we have argued
that the bulk of probabilistic reasoning is a System 1 process, i.e., a central
process unlikely to be associated with a single isolable brain region.
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abstract materials, which seemingly could not engage content.
The fact that regions associated with maintaining abstract rules
in memory are activated suggests that perhaps formal syntactic
processes are directly involved. There are good arguments against
this interpretation.
First, as I have argued, the functions engaged by a brain
region may well be in dispute. Whether we need to use abstract
rules in language processing or reasoning is contentious. In
language processing the debate has raged since the advent of
neural networks in the 1980s (Rumelhart, 1986). The issues
hinge on whether generalization is achieved by abstract general
rules or by similarity and analogy to pre-existing knowledge.
Thus, as we discussed above, whether MeFG co-ordinates the
processes involved in computing similarity and analogy or storing
abstract rules is contentious from this perspective. An interesting
prediction is that if computing similarity and analogy is involved
in reasoning with abstract material one might expect more rather
than less general knowledge to be activated. As materials become
more abstract they will be similar to more of what we know,
e.g., to all domains we tend to describe using conditionals. We
may find an answer to this question once appropriate methods to
image System 1in action are used.
Second, it seems doubtful that humans have evolved a specific
module for handling abstract logical rules of inference that are the
product of the last two millennia of logico-philosophical labor.
Formal logic is a cultural product, a tool, for reasoning with
pencil paper or computer. It is not the workings of the human
mind made concrete in symbols. The if. . .then construction
is used ubiquitously because it can be used to describe the
various relationships or dependencies in the world, like causes,
dispositions, intentions, regulations and so on, which allow us to
predict what will happen next and to explain why what happened
happened. The reasoning mind is likely to be very concrete
constructing specific small scale models of reality in System 1, like
Kahnemen’s banana-vomit example or using specific relations,
and reasoning over these (Oaksford and Chater, 2013, 2014;
Oaksford, 2014, Submitted). These last two points make the
argument that there are functions, f2 and f3, that are in contention
to account for the tasks that engage MeFG. Consequently, there is
reasonable doubt about whether it engages abstract rules.
I finish this section by looking again at the function of the core
brain system identified by Prado et al. (2011). As I argued above,
it seems unlikely that either System 1 or System 2 processes in
most “deductive” reasoning tasks are like consciously performing
mental arithmetic like that required to solve the bat and ball
problem. However, in all reasoning tasks the results of these
processes must become conscious and be turned into a verbal
response to be delivered verbally (production task) or to match
to a range of possible response options (selection task). What
becomes conscious may also be a feeling of wrongness when the
outputs of System 1 and System 2 conflict.5 This would seem to be
the shared common core of most reasoning tasks. But of course it
is the final stage not the actual core of the reasoning process.
5De Neys et al. (2008) have shown that the anterior cingulate cortex, associated
with conflict detection, is active when these two systems conflict.
FURTHER IMAGING STUDIES
So far I have only discussed the fMRI localization studies included
in Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis. However, there are other
imaging studies using fMRI and other imaging techniques, such as
EEG using ERPs, Infra-red Spectroscopy (NIRS) and Transcranial
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), which are relevant to the dual-
process aspect of the new paradigm. In this section, I deal with
these further studies by the imaging technique used and then by
the task/functions investigated.
fMRI studies
Here I look at further fMRI studies used to investigate (i)
component process of deductive reasoning and (ii) the matching
effect (Evans and Lynch, 1973; Oaksford and Stenning, 1992).
Component processes. Some fMRI (Fangmeier et al., 2006) and
lesion studies (e.g., Reverberi et al., 2009) have concentrated on
the component processes of deductive reasoning. Reverberi et al.’s
(2009) lesion study was broadly consistent with the conclusion
of Prado et al. (2011) that the right hemisphere and imagistic
processing are not part of the core reasoning system. Right
frontal lesions did not impair deductive reasoning. Patients with
left frontal regions and impaired working memory did show
deficits. More revealing evidence distinguishing the fast System
1 from the slow System 2 would be expected from studies
investigating the time course of reasoning. Fangmeier et al. (2006)
investigated the component processes of deductive reasoning
separating out premise presentation, premise integration, and
validation. These stages were defined by the timing of the
presentation of two premises in visually presented spatial linear
syllogisms, e.g., premises: V X (after 2 s), X W (after 6 s),
conclusion: V W? (after 10 s). Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the
visual presentation of premises, the premise presentation phase
activated left and right occipital lobes. Premise integration and
validation phases shifted activation toward frontal structures. As
I have remarked, these purely visuospatial tasks are unlikely to
invoke the same reasoning processes that underlie human verbal,
reasoning. Moreover, the lack of content and the artificial pacing
of the stimulus presentation to allow data collection using the
relatively poor temporal resolution of fMRI are unlikely to be very
revealing of the rapid System 1 in action.
Matching effects. There have been studies looking at phenomena
that have provided evidence for dual processes, in particular, the
matching effect (Evans and Lynch, 1973). Matching occurs when
negations are included in the sentences used in a reasoning task.
Usually these are in conditionals, e.g., if there is an H then there
is not a circle. If asked to construct a falsifying instance of this
rule people find it relatively easy because the falsifying instance,
H and circle (a True/False instance TF), perceptually matches the
named items in the rule. However, if they are asked the same
question with the rule, if there is an H then there is a circle,
then they find it more difficult. The TF instance is, e.g., H and
square (or any non-circle), which does not completely match
the named items. In a PET study, Houdé et al. (2000) showed
that prior to perceptual inhibition training, this task primarily
activated occipital visual regions, consistent with perceptual
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matching, but post inhibition training activation shifted to
more frontal areas. More recently, Prado and Noveck (2006,
2007) have used fMRI to investigate the matching phenomenon.
Prado and Noveck (2007) used a novel parametric variation
approach identifying brain regions whose activation varied with
the number of mismatches or negations in a rule. They also
showed that frontal regions, which became more active with more
mismatches, showed decreases in their interactions with visual
cortex, consistent with inhibiting matching. Perceptual matching
can be regarded as one of the perhaps many subsystems of
System 1 (Stanovich, 2011) and the frontal systems that inhibit
this system is System 2.
The new paradigm is an evolving body of theory and there is
active disagreement over the interpretations of some phenomena.
Evans (2003) cites Houdé et al. (2000) as support for the dual
process theory. However, there are many reasons to doubt that
these PET and fMRI studies are recording System 1 in action.
First, there is a very close overlap in the regions activated in
Houdé et al. (2000) pre-intervention phase and in Fangmeier
et al.’s (2006) premise presentation phase. Of course, it is not
surprising that presenting premises activates visual areas as
written language is still a visual stimulus. There is no immediate
reason to think that activity in these regions should be a source
of reasoning bias. Second, matching is a far more nuanced
phenomenon than described in Houdé et al. (2000) and in Prado
and Noveck (2006, 2007). For example, in the original studies
(Evans, 1972; Oaksford and Stenning, 1992) it occurs only for
falsifying trials, like the example in the last paragraph. However,
verifying trials (constructing True/True instances) show a similar
pattern of mismatches as for falsifying trials. So, if the matching
phenomenon were a simple perceptual matching effect then
both types of trial should reveal the bias. Third, much simpler
manipulations than inhibition training remove this bias. For
example, using real world thematic content rather than abstract
alphanumeric stimuli or shapes removes the bias (Oaksford and
Stenning, 1992). This simple fact suggests that matching is not
a major factor in biasing everyday reasoning. Moreover, making
it easier to identify the “contrast class” for a negated constituent
removes the bias. Logically the contrast class for there is not a circle
can be anything, literally, that is not a circle (e.g., a coal scuttle).
But in context it is clear that another shape is intended. If there
were only two shapes and participants knew this, then matching
is likely to disappear, as it does when using rules like if there is a
vowel, then there is not an even number (Oaksford and Stenning,
1992). A number that is not even is obviously odd. Prado and
Noveck (2007) did detect areas that were differentially active
depending on the number of negations, i.e., right anterior pre-
frontal cortex, and suggest that this may be involved in computing
contrast classes.
Oaksford and Stenning (1992), (see also Oaksford and
Moussakowski, 2004) argued that the matching phenomenon is
part of the normal process of computing contrast classes which
is made difficult by the use of abstract material. They also show
how this account combines with the probabilistic component of
the new paradigm to explain matching effects both in the Wason
selection task (Oaksford and Chater, 1994, 2003, 2007) and in the
conditional inference task (Oaksford et al., 2000). Constructing
contrast classes is part of the System 1 processes involved in
generating probabilities.
Why do these imaging studies show the effects they do,
i.e., mismatches correlated with regions that are inhibiting
visual areas? I suspect that this is part of the much more
general phenomenon of suppressing distracting information
in attentional control. If shown a picture of a white bear
(Wegner, 1994) and told not to think about it, all you can
think about is white bears. Similar patterns of activation
are likely to occur on many tasks requiring the suppression
of distractors regardless of whether they are reasoning tasks.
Moreover, suppression in the visual modality can be made more
difficult in the presence of noise in the auditory modality.
There is also work on the neural basis of these effects (Smucny
et al., 2013) which reveals similar interactions between brain
regions as shown by Prado and Noveck (2007). fMRI scanners
are very noisy places and PET scanners are also quite noisy.
Consequently, while being scanned these attentional effects
would be expected to be even more pronounced and to
dominate the normal processes of contrast class construction.
In normal discourse, a whole range of phonetic, syntactic,
semantic and pragmatic factors contribute to making contrast
class construction easy (Oaksford and Stenning, 1992). It is only
in abstract tasks where these supports are removed that matching
is observed.
In sum, there is good reason to doubt that these studies of
matching bias tap into the fast System 1 responsible for the effects
in Kahneman (2011) anecdotal example and in contrast class
construction (although Prado and Noveck (2007) show some
evidence for the localization of these latter processes). Rather
the primary effects observed seem to be concerned with the
general suppression of distractors observed in many tasks which
are exacerbated by the noisy environment of the scanner.
NIRS, TMS and belief bias
The studies we looked at in the last section all used fMRI which
has limited temporal resolution and so is perhaps unlikely to
reveal much about fast System 1 processes. Where they have
been revealing on System 2 processes this has primarily involved
the function of dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex in inhibiting
distracting information emanating from visual areas not of the
analytic processes thought to require working memory. Perhaps
a better insight into the neural processes involved at the interface
between System 1 and System 2 might be found using imaging
methods with greater temporal resolution. In this section, I
briefly look and working using near infra-red spectroscopy and
TMS.
A series of four studies using NIRS by Tsujii et al. investigated
the role of inferior frontal cortex (IFC, which includes the
IFG) in the belief bias effect (Tsujii and Watanabe, 2009,
2010; Tsujii et al., 2010, 2011). This effect has also been
assumed to provide evidence for dual processes. The effect is
usually investigated using quantified syllogisms which can be
systematically varied along the binary dimensions of validity
(valid, invalid) and believability of the conclusion (believable,
unbelievable). For example, No mammals are birds, All dogs
are birds, therefore, No dogs are birds is valid and believable,
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whereas No pigeons are mammals, All pigeons are birds, therefore,
No birds are mammals is invalid and believable. The belief
bias effect is an interaction effect (Evans et al., 1983) such
that people endorse invalid believable conclusions as much as
valid believable conclusions (92% in both cases), whereas they
endorse valid unbelievable conclusions (46%) far more than
invalid unbelievable conclusions (8%). Accuracy is far greater
for congruent trials (valid/believable and invalid/unbelievable,
92%) than for incongruent trials (valid/unbelievable and
invalid/believable, 37%). In these imaging studies accuracy on
congruent and incongruent trials was the behaviorial dependent
variable. Incongruent trials require the System 1 belief based
response to be inhibited to allow the System 2 analytic response
to be made.
In Tsujii et al.’ studies they used manipulations to impair
working memory performance either by using a dual task (Tsujii
and Watanabe, 2009), time restrictions (Tsujii and Watanabe,
2010), or by using repetitive TMS on the IFC region (Tsujii et al.,
2010) thought to be involved in working memory. High dual
task load, short time restriction, and right IFC rTMS stimulation
led to less accurate performance but only on incongruent trials.
High dual task load and a short time restriction also reduced
IFC/IFG activation but only in the right hemisphere. These
findings suggest that right IFG is required to inhibit the System 1
heuristic or belief based response. In a further study, Tsujii et al.
(2011) also used rTMS on the superior parietal lobule (SPL)
as well as IFG using the belief bias paradigm. Stimulation in
this region impaired performance on abstract syllogisms and
incongruent trials, which they suggest require analytic System
2 processes. Tsujii et al. conclude that the function of right
IFG is in inhibiting belief biased responding, the function of
left IFG is a language area responsible for semantic processing
and belief bias, while the function of bilateral SPL is analytic
reasoning.
There are several points to make about these NIRS studies.
First, the activations were integrated over a period lasting over
a minute and so are not looking at rapid processes of the type
that underlie Kahneman’s System 1. Second, the results are not
consistent with previous fMRI studies. For example, the seat of
inhibitory processing has moved from DLPFC (BA 46) in Prado
and Noveck (2007) to right IFG (BA 44, 45, 47). Moreover,
there seems to be little evidence of Prado et al.’s (2011) core
left lateralized deductive reasoning system. Further problems of
interpretation arise from the interactional nature of the belief bias
phenomenon.
Recently, Dube et al. (2010) showed that the belief bias
interaction has been misinterpreted. They show that the
interaction effect observed in belief bias is consistent with
curvilinear ROC curves. Properly analyzed, accuracy remains
the same between conditions, and believability effects are
pure response biases. They argue that their modeling results,
“provide support for processing theories of deduction that
assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength
variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by
Chater and Oaksford (1999).” Their results are also consistent
with probabilistic single function dual process theory (Oaksford
and Chater, 2012, 2014). There is a clear distinction between
processes based on long term memory for our beliefs about the
world and processes that require working memory. However, the
single function approach argues that these processes, where they
concern reasoning, are both probabilistic.
Dube et al.’s (2010) analysis shows that the belief bias
phenomenon that underpins the theoretical framework (logical
analytic System 2 and belief based/heuristic System 1) used to
interpret Tsujii et al. results, may not actually exist. A similar
state of affairs exists in the study of optimism bias (Weinstein and
Klein, 1996) where proper statistical analysis (Harris and Hahn,
2011) has shown that this phenomenon, apparently investigated
in many imaging studies (e.g., Sharot et al., 2011), may not
actually exist. These re-analyses of these phenomena are at the
computational level, i.e., they show that the actual functions being
computed in these tasks may not be what they first seemed. As
we argued in the section Imaging beyond System 1, theories of
function drive the interpretation of these imaging results, i.e.,
its function first. Consequently the interpretation of Tsujii et al.
results may need to be re-thought.
A paper aimed at making general theoretical points
about the current state of imaging research into deductive
reasoning is not the place to offer such a re-interpretation
of these results. However, it is worth observing that the
interpretation is going to be further complicated by the
fact the that people seem to unconsciously process both
the nominally analytic and heuristic responses as evidenced
by the activation of brain regions associated with conflict
detection, i.e., the anterior cingulate cortex, whether people
make the supposedly biased response or not (De Neys
et al., 2008). That is, both possible responses seem to be
computed in System 1. Such findings tend to suggest that
System 2 doesn’t so much do analytic reasoning as adjudicate
between possibilities and form a response (Oaksford, 2014,
Submitted).
In sum, a major problem for imaging research is that there
seem to be no onus to explore all the possible computational
level interpretations of any set of results. Moreover, there is only a
very loose connection between function and the activity of brain
regions assumed to compute it. For example, the inference to
SPL being the seat of analytic reasoning is based on a statistical
tendency for rTMS stimulation of that region to impair abstract
and incongruent tasks. In the light of Dube et al.’s analysis, it is
very difficult to know what to make of this result. However, it most
certainly does not tie this region to making deductive inference in
a mental logic.
ERP and conditional inference
To explore the brain systems involved in the rapid System 1
processes, event related potentials recorded using EEG would
seem to be the most promising route. The temporal resolution
is excellent and many of the evoked waveforms have a well
understood interpretation developed over many years of research.
The studies I review here have all focused on the conditional
reasoning paradigm. Inexplicably, some studies on conditional
reasoning using ERPs have focused on contentless, abstract
material (Bonnefond and Van der Henst, 2009). This is despite the
fact that in the psychology of conditional inference, the dominant
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paradigm since Cummins et al. (1991) ground breaking paper has
been the causal conditional inference task, which has arguably
completely altered the theoretical landscape of research into the
conditional.
The failure to consider the full theoretical possibilities is
repeated in Bonnefond and Van der Henst (2013), who introduce
the paper using the theoretical framework of mental logic, which
has not been applied to any of the major results in conditional
inference over the last twenty years of research. They argue that a
sustained late positive component to the EEG waveform suggests
that “participants consider logical arguments as a rule-governed
sequence.” The absence of an N400 (a negative going waveform
at around 400 ms) associated with semantic processing is not
consistent with apparent inconsistencies being semantic in origin
rather than formal. The implication of their results is that, even
though their materials introduced content, the main effect was
to facilitate activation of terms expected as a matter of logical
inference.
However, even more recently Bonnefond et al. (2014)
investigated the correlates of defeaters in conditional inference.
A defeater in a causal conditional reasoning task is an event that
could prevent the cause from producing its effect. For example, if
you turn the key the car starts, is defeated by the petrol tank being
empty or the battery being flat. In the Cummins paradigm, causal
conditionals are pretested for the number of defeaters they allow.
The primary behavioral observation is that the more defeaters a
conditional allows, the less willing participants are to endorse the
MP inference. Bonnefond et al. (2014) replicated these results and
found specific effects on EEG waveforms. Their main finding was
that presenting the conclusion of an MP inference led to,
“. . .a more pronounced N2 and less pronounced P3b for many
disabler conditionals. In the ERP literature this specific N2/P3b
pattern has been linked to the violation and satisfaction of
expectations, respectively. . .Thereby, the present ERP findings
support the idea that disabler retrieval specifically modulates
our expectations that the standard MP conclusion will follow.”
(Bonnefond et al. (2014), p. 258).
It is suggested that these results are consistent with conditional
inference not being mediated by formal logical rules. Indeed
the first demonstration of defeater effects (Byrne, 1989) was
interpreted as refuting mental logicians’ explanation of why
introducing alternative causes leads to reduced levels of the
affirming the consequent fallacy (Braine et al., 1984). Such
pragmatic factors may influence fallacies but they would not
be expected to affect logical rules of inference such as MP if
they play a role in real human inference. That is, Bonnefond
et al.’s (2014) results showing the brain correlates of defeater
information supplies just the evidence required to refute their
interpretation of their own previous results (Bonnefond and
Van der Henst, 2013). These results are also consistent with the
probabilistic approach adopted in the new paradigm (Oaksford
et al., 2000; Oaksford and Chater, 2007).
Another recent ERP study of conditional reasoning using
the MP inference has shown a strong N400 component, which
Bonnefond and Van der Henst (2013) did not observe (Blanchette
and El-Deredy, 2014). This component of time locked EEG signals
is strongly related to the processing of semantic content (Kutas
and Hilyard, 1980). This early response to the premises of an
argument is consistent with Kahneman’s banana-vomit example:
the content of the premises is processed very rapidly. Blanchette
and El-Deredy (2014) conclude that “conditional reasoning is
not a purely formal process but that it importantly implicates
semantic processing.” This conclusion is consistent with rapid
System 1 processes which generate the kinds of information we
discussed earlier and perhaps build an initial concrete model of
the described situation. Of course this interpretation does not
preclude System 2 involvement at some later point in the process.
In summary, the last two ERP studies reviewed are the
closest to seeing System 1 in action. Bonnefond et al. (2014)
also very commendably concede that their results question
their earlier interpretation of their findings using abstract
materials. Nonetheless, it is concerning that imaging results are
published which do not consider the current state of theoretical
development a topic has achieved in other areas of cognitive
science. I can but agree with Bonnefond et al.’s (2014, p. 260)
conclusion:
“Behavioral studies have also focused on the impact of different
types of conditionals (e.g., tips, warnings, promises, and causal
statements). . .We belief [sic] that the present study will pave the
way for a further exploration of the neural basis of these content
factors in future studies.”
Such studies are a pressing need in this area but also required
are methods that allow a much tighter integration between formal
computational level theories of function and the brain.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have discussed the interpretation of what is
currently known about the brain systems involved in human
deductive reasoning mainly using different imaging techniques
to localize function to specific brain regions. In doing so, I
have dealt with the results of Prado et al.’s (2011) meta-analysis
and a range of other results from the perspective of the new
paradigm in human reasoning. Prado et al. (2011) identified a
relatively restricted group of brain regions consistently activated
in deductive reasoning tasks. Like the studies in the meta-
analysis, Prado et al. (2011) interpret their results largely in terms
of mental logic and mental models theories. In this paper, I
have reinterpreted most of these findings in terms of the new
paradigm in reasoning which is a probabilistic dual process
theory.
The first substantive issue to emerge was that Prado et al.
identify their core left lateralized system with Gazzaniga’s left
brain interpreter hypothesis. This identification is not consistent
with this system being dedicated to deductive reasoning. The
kinds of inferences that motivates Gazzaniga’s hypothesis are
elaborative, defeasible inferences of the type that motivated the
introduction of the probabilistic approach to human reasoning
(Oaksford and Chater, 1991). Moreover, this is exactly the mode
of inference, i.e., non-demonstrative inference involving world
knowledge, which Fodor (1983) identified with central cognitive
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processes, i.e., those processes least likely to be subserved by an
isolable cognitive module.
The second substantive issue concerned the apparent inability
of the studies used in the meta-analysis to uncover the brain
regions involved in System 1 processes. These are highly content
dependent and are responsible for the automatic computation
of a range of information used in inference. As I argued, the
subtraction methodology and meta-analytic approach meant
the whole brain diffuse activations caused by specific contents
(Pereira et al., 2011) must have been subtracted out. Thus the
current methodology would appear to leave us largely ignorant
of the brain systems involved in System 1. I also explored a range
of other results using different imaging techniques and two recent
ERP studies (Blanchette and El-Deredy, 2014; Bonnefond et al.,
2014) seem to show results capable of illuminating the nature of
System 1.
Many of the studies using other techniques also seemed to
have problems related to the third substantive issue concerning
the interpretation of active brain regions. The interpretation
of these findings depends on the computational level theory
of the function engaged by a cognitive task. In general, either
the attribution of function provided by Prado et al. (2011)
was broadly consistent with the new paradigm, e.g., categorical
reasoning, or it was clear that there were multiple interpretations
of the function a region computed, e.g., abstract rules vs.
similarity and analogy or small scale models of specific relations.
Similar problems arose for the interpretation of studies of
matching bias using fMRI (Prado and Noveck, 2006, 2007) and
the NIRS studies of Tsujii et al. There is a failure to consider the
full range of computational level interpretations available in the
area.
While the localization approach has provided useful
information about the brain systems involved in deductive
reasoning, and its extension to looking a functional connectivity
may be even more revealing, the interpretation of these results
remains problematic. Certainly, following Goel (2007), I doubt
that any single isolable region “does” deductive or inductive
reasoning. Reasoning and inference are not special purpose add-
ons to the cognitive system. Unconscious inference in perception
and action, elaborative inference in language understanding and
explicit verbal reasoning are major functions of the brain. These
processes allow us to act adaptively and comprehend an uncertain
world the state of which at any point in time we are mostly
ignorant. Inference allows us to make the best guess about what
will happen next, what someone means, and whether what they
said is a good argument. One would imagine that a large amount
of cortex would be dedicated to these processes.
System 1 automatically generates a large range of information
and if the results using simple stimuli, e.g., thinking of horses,
is anything to go by many diffuse brain regions will be activated
by the materials in a reasoning problem. It is a reasonable
hypothesis that this is the source of information for the left brain
interpreter. The nature of System 2 is less clear. Results on logical
intuitions suggest that people are unconsciously generating the
logically correct answer even as they give the biased response.
A radical possibility is that analytic (putatively System 2) and
heuristic/probabilistic process (putatively System 1) are both
computed by the one System, i.e., System 1 (Oaksford, 2014,
Submitted). That is, in spontaneous human reasoning, without
logical training, pencil and paper, computer, or friends, there
is no conscious analytic process akin to the mental arithmetic
required to solve the bat and ball problem. That is, all spontaneous
reasoning is unconscious (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). System
2 is where the products of these processes are posted and
decisions made about which response to go with and which
response to inhibit (Oaksford, 2014, Submitted). This is the
core system most likely identified in Prado et al.’s (2011)
meta-analysis, and thus interpreted, it seems that fMRI and
lesions studies have been most revealing of these slow System 2
processes.
An approach is required that can reveal how the interactions
between Systems unfolds over time and how these different
systems communicate with the process of forming a response.
System 1 responds rapidly and as we have seen, two very recent
EEG studies (Blanchette and El-Deredy, 2014; Bonnefond et al.,
2014), with good temporal resolution seem to provide the most
informative studies of System 1 in action. Perhaps the most
important innovation would be to conduct studies that had the
potential to tightly correlate formal computational models of
reasoning to brain activation be it using ERPs or fMRI. Many
models of reasoning are formally well specified. These tend to
be mostly emanating from the probabilistic side of the new
paradigm (Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Chater and Oaksford,
1999; Oaksford et al., 2000). Formal models of dual processes
are less in evidence, although Klauer et al. (2010), for example,
present a formal model with a specific parameter that indexes
System 1 vs. System 2 involvement. The value of such formal
models is that model based imaging can reveal correlations
between specific parameters of the formal model and brain
activation providing much tighter integration between imaging
results and the computational level. Pursing this line, I would
argue, could provide a more integrated approach bringing the
computational level and the implementational level into closer
alignment.
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